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POINT I
THE UTAH COURTS ARE
NOT OPEN TO NATHAN GARZA
The defendant argues that the Medical Malpractice
anti-tolling and repose statutes do not violate the Utah
Constitution's Open Courts provision.

The defendant argues

that with no outright bar of minors1 claims, there is no
violation.

However,

the

Open

Courts

provision

may

be

violated, even though no outright bar exists.
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985) , the Utah Supreme Court invalidated the Utah
Products Liability statute of repose.

The Court said that

the statute violated the Open Courts provision.
did not bar all claims outright.

The statute

Rather, it only barred

claims which arose a certain number of years after the
injuring product was manufactured

or

sold.

The Supreme

Court quoted with approval Heath v. Sears Roebuck and Co.,
464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983), to the effect that the Utah
Open Courts provision contemplates that plaintiffs will have
a sufficient time after a claim has accrued in which to
file.

Berry, at 673-74. The court, therefore, broadly de-

clared the statute unconstitutional because the plaintiff
was "arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to
protect basic individual rights."

Id. at 675.

The Utah Medical Malpractice anti-tolling and repose statutes deprive Nathan and all other similarly situated minors of the effective remedies designed to protect

their basic individual rights. Within the statutory limitations period, Nathan did not have sufficient understanding
to "discover11 his medical malpractice claim.

Further, with-

out a guardian, he was legally incompetent to enforce any of
his legal rights in a Utah court.

Utah Rule of Civil Proce-

dure, 17.
The protection of Nathan!s legal rights were left
exclusively within the hands of his parents.

However, many

courts have recognized that minors1 rights often go unprotected

due

guardians.

to

the

inadequacies

of

their

parents

or

See, e.g., Scott v. School Board of Granite

School District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1977); Barrio v.
San Manuel Division Hospital, 692 P.2d 280, 295-96 (Ariz.
1984);

and, Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667

(Tex.

1983).
In

states

where

an

open

court

clause

is

interpreted to be more than a mere statement of philosophy,
repose and anti-tolling provisions like those in Utah's

Defendant clouds the issue with federal authorities
and
state
cases
involving
different
constitutional
challenges. Even where open court provisions exist, not all
states give them the meaning given Utah's in Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, supra. (See page 25, footnote 2 of Respondent's
brief.) Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984)
was decided before the Utah Supreme Court determined the
scope of Utah's Open Courts provision in Berry.

Medical

Malpractice

Act

have

been

invalidated.

Sax v.

Votteler, supra; Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital,
supra.

These cases hold that such provisions unreasonably

deprive affected minors of an effective remedy.
It is factually and legally wrong to avoid the
issue by claiming that Nathan was on an "equal footing" with
an adult.

Unlike adults which are granted some discovery

period, Nathan had no real opportunity to discover his medical malpractice claim.

Even if he could comprehend his

claim, he could not turn the key to the courthouse door
without an adult acting for him.

Nathan's "effective reme-

dies" were taken from him by the Medical Malpractice Actfs
anti-tolling and repose clauses.

The Utah Open Courts pro-

vision has therefore been violated.

POINT II
NATHAN'S RIGHTS
WERE TAKEN ARBITRARILY
The

defendant

argues

that

the

legislature may

limit a minor's cause of action just as it does an adults.
However, the legislature may not act arbitrarily without
violating
Protection

the Utah Open Courts provision
provisions

Constitutions.

of

the

Utah

and

and

the Equal

United

States

The Utah Medical Malpractice anti-tolling

and repose statutes arbitrarily effect minors.

They are,
«

therefore, unconstitutional.

Children injured by health care providers suffer
equally as much as those injured in other circumstances.
However, the legislature refuses to protect claims of minors
injured by doctors while protecting all other claims.
Staleness, or loss of evidence, equally affects
the trial of the negligent doctor and the negligent driver.
However, the doctor is protected from a minor's claim, the
driver not.

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has said

that the staleness and fraudulent claims arguments should
not defeat justice.

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 (Utah

1984); Szaval v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981); Myers
v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981); Switzer v. Reynolds,
606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).
Finally, the application of the anti-tolling and
repose statutes may bring to a final, unalterable conclusion
the claims of children who are barely two years old.

The

effect of the law on minors is clearly arbitrary.
The

case of Scott v.

School District, 568 P. 2d

746

School Board
(Utah

1977)

of Granite
supports the

conclusion that arbitrary application of the anti-tolling
statute violates constitutional protections.
claims that plaintiff misapplies the case.
states however that:

The defendant

The case clearly

[A] minor claimant is justly entitled to
the protection afforded by said Section
78-12-36(1), U.C.A., 1953, (the tolling
provision of the Utah Code) , in all
cases, including notice requirements of
the type contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. To hold otherwise
is a denial of due process and equal
protection.
Id. at 748. [Emphasis added].
The
tolling

and

arbitrary
repose

nature

and

statutes make

effect

of

the

anti-

them unconstitutional.

Nathan Garza should have his day in court.

POINT III
THE ANTI-TOLLING AND REPOSE STATUTES
VIOLATE THE STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION TESTS
The defendant claims there is an insurance crisis.
The defendant claims that the Utah Legislature acted in
response to that crisis by passing Section 78-14-4.

Whether

a crisis exists or notf

laws must not violate equal protection or other constitutional guarantees. 2

Defendant misses the point of plaintiff's arguments by
asserting that "Plaintiff also contends there is no medical
malpractice insurance crisis."
(Respondent's brief, page
13.) To be sure, it is far from clear that an insurance
crisis existed when the contemplated provisions were
enacted. Even today, disputes exist over whether present
increases in rates are caused by injured people being
compensated for their disabilities or by poor management.
See, "The Manufactured Crisis," Consumer Reports, August
1986 at 544, (See Exhibit A) and Golberg "Doctors and
Lawyers Face Off," 72 A.B.A.J., 38 (1986). But regardless
of the existence of any such crisis, then or now, means of
addressing the perceived problem must meet constitutional
standards.

In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah, 1984),
the Utah Supreme Court explained

that a law must apply

equally to all persons within a class.

Furthermore, the

statutory classifications and different treatment given the
classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statute.

Id.

In applying the first prong of the equal protection test the defendant incorrectly identifies and too
narrowly defines the class in question.

The class in ques-

tion is all minors tortiously injured under Utah law.
Utah law does not apply equally within that class.

The

As ex-

plained above, the Utah law protects, until majority, the
claims of minors injured other than by medical malpractice.
However, those injured by health care providers have only
two years to commence an action.

The first prong of the

test is not met.
Nor is the second prong of the test met.

As

discussed in the Appellant's Brief, children's claims make
up a very small portion of the total medical malpractice
actions.
statutory

Furthermore, many of those are brought within the
period.

Respondent's

(Appellant's

Brief, at

10.)

Brief

at

To eliminate

6-7;
such

See

also

a small

number of claims has no reasonable tendency to further the
objectives of the statute; lower malpractice insurance rates
and insure health care for Utah.

Also, the court in Malan,

supra, clearly stated that it was inappropriate to create
classes of individuals simply to lower premiums.

Defendant claims that the elimination

of these

rights are required to maintain the availability of health
care

in

Utah.

The

defendant

says

that

the

insurance

industry cannot anticipate the risk of claims delayed into
the future.

To allow delay will destroy the malpractice

insurance industry says the defendant.

Howeverf prior to

the enactment of the anti-tolling and repose statutes, the
insurance industry was capable of calculating the risks of
delayed

claims.

In

fact,

the

industry

continues

to

calculate delay risks for minors1 claims, other than medical
malpractice.

The passage of the anti-tolling and repose

statutes did not render the insurance industry incapable of
calculating such risks.

The defense argument is without

merit.
The

severe

treatment

given

minors

injured

by

medical malpractice is an arbitrary and impermissible way of
dealing with any insurance crisis.
second
evidence

guessing
that

the

This is not a matter of

legislature.

long-tail

claims

There
of

simply

minors

significant effect on the insurance industry.
few less claims would be brought.

is

have

no
any

Obviously, a

But it is just as obvious

that any insurance crisis would continue whether or not the
repose and anti-tolling provisions existed.

The legisla-

ture's determined effort to stifle minors' claims amounts to
nothing more than destroying claims just to detroy claims.
This

is the type of

incidious

State's constitution prevents.

discrimination which our

Malan v. Lewis, supra.

POINT IV
HEIGHTENED REVIEW IS APPROPRIATE

As applied to minors, the anti-tolling and repose
provisions of the medical malpractice act do not satisfy the
rational basis test outlined

in Malan.

Nevertheless, a

heightened standard of review would be appropriate for this
case.
In determining the standard of review, two important factors must be considered in this case.

First, the

right to bring a tort claim is a substantial right of con3
stitutional dimensions under Utah law . Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., supra; Bracken v. Dahle, 63 Ut. 486, 251, P.
16 (1926) . Second, the United States Supreme Court has more
closely examined laws that discriminatorily effect minors.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S.

91

(1982).

Considering

the

combination

of

these

factors, the rational basis test is insufficient to protect
the minors' rights.

A heightened level o*f review should be

applied.

Of course, the degree of judicial scrutiny required
under the Open Courts provision will be greater than the
scrutiny involved under the United States Constitution's
rational basis test.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft, supra;
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Al.
1982).

Other states have used heightened levels of review
in examining anti-tolling and repose provisions in their
medical malpractice

statutes.

See y Appellant's Brief at

15-16; Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Id.
1976); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d

825

(N.H. 1980); and

Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).

CONCLUSION

As
Act's

applied

anti-tolling

unconstitutional.

to minors, the Medical

provision
The

and

statute

provisions

Malpractice

of

violate

repose
Utah's

are
Open

Court's provision and deny Equal Protection under both the
state and federal Constitutions.
should

be

found

The relevant provisions

unconstitutional.

The

case

should

be

remanded for consideration on the merits.

DATED this 3 / day of

\/Jj/

1986.

ROBERT J. jflEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for/ Appellants
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The manufactured crisis
Liability-insurance companies have created a crisis
and dumped it on you.

W$MmH arch

23 1980 W3S a

'

'

•gggjPgJjjJ bright, beautiful spring
£ £ ? £ * » • d a v *n Gillette, Wyo. So
: : : : : : :
: : : : : : fl: : y : j| Alta Means thought she
would do some cleaning in a cottage she
owned. Her granddaughter, nine-year-old
Dustina Rhodes, lazily tagged along. Suddenly, the tiny cabin exploded into an
orangefireball,engulfing Means in flames
and blowing Dustina out the door. The
grandmother died a couple of weeks later
from massive burns; the granddaughter
survived but suffered severe burns.
A spark had ignited a cottage bloated
with propane gas—gas that leaked
through a Honeywell V8280 valve on the
cottage's room heater. That type of valve,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission subsequently said, tended to jam
open because of a defect in design and
manufacture. The valve was recalled by
Honeywell in 1985. Dustina Rhodes and
Alta Means' estate sued Honeywell for
their losses. They eventually settled for
more than $l-million.
Now the insurance industry and manufacturers are trying to pass legislation
that could make it more difficult to adequately compensate victims like Dustina
Rhodes for their injuries. The push for socalled "tort reform" is on at both the state
and Federal levels.
Insurers say legislation is needed to fix
a "crisis" that has made many types of liability insurance costly—or even impossible to get. The insurance industry has
launched a $6.5-million advertising campaign and an intense lobbying and publicrelations effort to lay the blame for its
financial problems on people who are
injured, juries, or lawyers.
The insurance crisis
The current liability-insurance crisis
began a little more than a year ago with
skyrocketing premiums and cancellations
of policies.
G In New Haven, Conn., a chain of
seven day-care centers affiliated with
Yale University saw its liability insurance
premium jump from $400 in 1984 to
$2400 last year.
Q In Brooksville, Fla., a general vascular surgeon paid $5000 for malpractice

insurance in 1984. In 1985, the rate tripled to $15,000, and this year he is paying
$38,000. The doctor is thankful he
doesn't practice in Miami, where his rates
would top $70,000 a year.
El In Hammondsport, N.Y., the Bully
Hill Winery has sharply curtailed its free
wine-tasting because its insurance premiums have gone from $3000 for $l-million
in coverage in 1985 to $8000 for
$500,000 in coverage in 1986.
U Aetna Life and Casualty has
recently dropped some 400 municipalities
from its liability-insurance rolls.
The increasing cost and declining availability of liability insurance affects everyone. Police departments cancel patrols
and cities dismantle playgrounds for lack
of municipal liability insurance. Many
obstetricians are leaving their field. The
number of nurse-midwives could shrink as
they, too, find it increasingly difficult—if
not impossible—to obtain malpractice
insurance. Doctors' escalating insurance
costs are bound to show up in their bills to
patients. Day-care centers could become
less affordable as their insurance rate
hikes are passed on to working parents.
The cost of owning a condominium rises
with every bump up in liability-insurance
premiums.
How it happened
In its advertising and in most statements to the press and the public, the
insurance industry lays blame for the crisis on lawyers, juries, or victims whose
alleged carelessness brought on their own
problems. Lawyers use the civil justice
system "to right every imagined wrong,"
cries the Insurance Information Institute,
an industry trade group.
A more objective analysis suggests that
the "crisis" is of the insurance industry's
own making. A Washington state task
force concluded last year that the crisis
"is mostly a result of poor management
practices by the [insurance] companies."
In New York, a report of the Governor's
Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance said that "the industry's poor recent
financial condition largely reflects selfinflicted wounds."
Insurance companies have two major

sources of money to cover claims and
make profits—the premiums policyholders pay, and the interest the companies
can earn on money that isn't immediately
needed to pay claims. When interest rates
are high, insurance companies try to gain
as many customers as possible, to bring in
the premium dollars they want to invest.
In the early 1980s, when interest rates
topped 20 percent, insurance companies
slashed premiums to sell as many policies
as they could.
"The insurance companies did anything
they could to get money to put into the
money markets," says Dennis Jay, a
spokesman for the Professional Insurance
Agents trade association. "They did not
underwrite the business as well as they
should have. [Underwriting is the science
of assessing risk and" setting an appropriate premium to cover the risk.] But it's
very tempting to get the money in today
to earn 21 percent interest and worry
about the losses later."
In 1981, the property-and-casualty
industry suffered a record $6.3-billion in
underwriting losses (premiums collected
minus expenses and claims paid). Yet
there was no "liability crisis." Investment
gains of $13.2-billion the same year still
created plush net profits.
The "crisis" came when interest rates
dropped, slowing the rise of investment
income. By 1984, the profit/loss picture
had reversed itself. Underwriting losses
of $21.5-billion exceeded investment
income of $17.7-billion. Even so, the
industry managed to show a small
profit—in large part as a result of the tax
benefits described on page 547.
In 1985, underwriting losses were
$24.7-billion, and investment income was
$19.5-billion. Because of tax benefits, the
industry again came out slightly ahead,
but profits were weak.
To right itself, the industry has taken
two major steps. First, it has jacked up
rates for all liability-insurance buyers to
levels that not only cover current costs
but, some critics charge, recoup losses
from mismanagement in previous years.
Second, companies have dropped lines of
business designated as "high risk."
When pressed, some insurance-indus-

try representatives concede that the
effect of the business cycle on interest
rates is a major factor in the present crisis. 'The fact that premiums are going up
at high rates is purely due to the cycle,"
says Sean Mooney, senior vice president
at the Insurance Information Institute. He
nevertheless maintains that the "lawsuit
crisis" is the reason that some parties
can't get liability insurance at all.
An orchestrated campaign
The insurance industry is trying to turn
its crisis into an opportunity—a chance to
press for one of its favorite objectives,
"tort reform." In plain words, the industry's version of tort reform means placing
limits on the rights of injured people to
sue for and recover damages.
The latest round in the industry's longstanding campaign began in early 1985.
At that time, insurance-industry leaders
already knew that a cycle-borne crisis that
would necessitate jarring premium
increases was brewing. The industry
launched an advertising program aimed at
U.S. opinion leaders—politicians, business leaders, executives, and journalists.
In June, 1985, John Byrne, then chairman of the board of. Geico, a major
insurance company, told the Casualty
Actuaries of New York that "the insurance industry should quit covering doctors, chemical manufacturers, and corporate officers and directors." Byrne also
said, "It is right for the industry to withdraw and let pressure for [tort] reform
build in the courts and in the state legislatures."
By summer of 1985, insurance rates
indeed started rising. As the varied group
of liability-insurance consumers began to
feel the squeeze, they started to complain.
Through the second half of last year, a
grass-roots coalition of doctors, municipalities, nurse-midwives, manufacturers,
day-care centers, and others with insurance problems came together. Many of
them believed what the insurance industry was telling them: that greedy lawyers
and excessive jury verdicts were to blame
for the increasing insurance rates.
In early 1986, the Journal of American
Insurance pointed to the tort-reform
movement as a superb example of coalition-building by the insurance industry.
This March, the Insurance Information
Institute announced a $6.5-million advertising campaign to sell "the lawsuit crisis." This second campaign, still in
progress, is aimed at the general public.
Print and television commercials talk
about the possible demise of high-school
football and other sports programs and
suggest you write to the Insurance Information Institute. If you do write, you get
advice on how to influence legislators.
CONSUMER REPORTS
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Voters, the insurance people hope, will
pass the message of panic on to their state
and Federal representatives.
Those 'high' awards
Insurance-industry leaders say that the
average award in product-liability cases is
now more than $l-million.
That figure—and many others used by
the industry—is based on statistics compiled by Jury Verdict Research, a firm in
Solon, Ohio, that keeps track of such
things. The Jury Verdict Research statistics, however, don't reflect reality very
well.
The statistics are raw data on initial
awards by a jury, and that's usually not the
last word in litigation. Cases are often
appealed, and the appeals court may
reduce the award or overturn the verdict,
resulting in an award of zero. To avoid the
uncertainty and added expense of an
appeal, some plaintiffs and defendants
agree to an immediate post-trial settlement, which can be significantly lower
than what the jury awarded.
Trial judges also reduce jury awards.
Indeed, the very first multimillion-dollar
award on record ($3.5-million in damages
won by actor John Henry Faulk in 1962
for being blacklisted for his political views
in the 1950s) was reduced to $450,000 by
the judge. According to one study, done
by the Rand Corporation's Institute for
Civil Justice, half of the initial jury awards
surveyed were reduced after the trial.
The largest awards were the ones most
likely to be reduced and subject to the biggest reductions.
There are other important reasons why
the average verdict numbers are, statistically speaking, extremely "soft." The
Jury Verdict Research statistics include
only verdicts in favor of the plaintiff.
Cases that the defendant wins and that
result in an award of zero are not counted.
Cases settled before trial aren't counted
either.
One unusually large verdict can skew
the numbers by pulling the annual average
way up. Such was the case in 1978, when
a jury awarded more than $127-million to
a man who was seriously burned when a
gasoline tank exploded in an accident
involving a Ford Pinto. As a result of that
one verdict, the average product-liability
award in 1978, according to the Jury Verdict Research, hit $1.7-million—up an
astounding 285 percent over the previous
year's average. But the trial judge later
reduced the Pinto award to $6.7-million.
Had the statistics accurately reflected
Insurers are spending millions of
dollars—including $6.5-million through
the Insurance Information Institute—to
sell the idea of a ''lawsuit crisis."

Good Advice

runs in
the family.
Give your children the facts
and fun of Penny Power...
the Consumer Reports
for kids 8-14.
As a Consumer Reports reader, you count
on good advice. Now, so can your kids, with1
the good-advice magazine all their own:
Penny Power.
Each issue of Penny Power helps your kids
become more confident about money. They'll
learn how to start a budget. Discover ways to
earn pocket money. Find out which products
are best buys.
And Penny Power is fun, too. Stories,
comics, games and do-it-yourself projects
help your child have fun while building
smart buying habits that last a lifetime.
So let the advice and the fun begin by
ordering Penny Power today. A full year (6 bimonthly issues) is only $11.96. Or order two
years for $19.95 and save $3.95. Simply
mail the coupon below.
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that, they would have shown the average
award in 1978 to be just 19.5 percent
over the previous year, not 285 percent.
It's best to look at median awards
rather than average awards. To be sure,
the average would provide the best gauge
of the industry's costs—if the figures
were trustworthy. But, as we've seen,
average awards are disproportionately
influenced by a few large verdicts—the
very ones most apt to be reduced posttrial. Furthermore, it's the median, not
the average, that shows how the typical
injured person is compensated.
Between 1975 and 1984, according to
Jury Verdict Research, the growth in the
median initial medical-malpractice award
has been less than the rise in inflation. In
product-liability cases, the growth rate for
median initial awards has exceeded the
inflation rate, but not by much.
The Rand Corporation's Institute for
Civil Justice has tracked tort action in San
Francisco and in Cook County, 111., which
includes Chicago, since 1960. It has found
that the median initial award, adjusted for
inflation, stayed virtually level.
The phantom explosion
The explosion that claimed the life of
Alta Means was real. The so-called "litigation explosion" repeatedly cited by
advocates of tort reform is essentially a
myth. Under close scrutiny, many of the
facts and figures cited by tort-reform
advocates do not hold up:
Assertion: The U.S. is in the midst of a
"litigation explosion."
Fact: Last year, the National Center
for State Courts (a nonprofit group funded
largely by the courts themselves) analyzed data on tort litigation in 20 state
courts for the years 1978, 1981, and
1984. Careful examination of the data
"provides no evidence to support the existence of a national 'litigation explosion' in
state trial courts during the 1981-84 time
period," said Dr. Robert Roper, a project
director at the center.
The center's data show that the annual
number of tortfilingsin 17 states studied
rose 9 percent between 1978 and 1984.
Meanwhile, population in those states
rose 8 percent. While court filings in 20
states did rise 14 percent between 1978
and 1981, they fell 4 percent between
1981 and 1984.
The number of liability cases filed in
Federal courts has increased significantly.
But a single type of suit—damage claims
related to asbestos—accounts for much of
the increase. Last year, 4239 of the
13,554 product-liability casesfiledin Federal courts—31 percent—were asbestosis cases. That's not surprising. Asbestosis and asbestos-induced cancer result
from many years of exposure; only in

recent years have the consequences of
long-term exposure become evident in
debilitating illness and death. In CU's
opinion, people who are suffering from
asbestosis or asbestos-induced cancer
(and the families of those who have died)
deserve compensation.
Assertion: Plaintiffs win million-dollar
verdicts regardless of merit.
Fact: Stories told to prove this point
are, at most, isolated incidents, and are
often exaggerated to the point of myth.
Insurers like to cite their favorite horror
stories—about large awards given to a
woman who said she lost her psychic powers after a hospital CAT scan, or to a man
who injured himself using a lawn mower
to trim a hedge, or to a California vandal
who injured himself falling through a
school-building skylight.
Such anecdotes typ-cally lose some
important details and gain a few embellishments in the telling. Take the case of
the psychic. Both United Press International and Associated Press made much of
the fact that Judith Haimes was awarded
close to $1-million by a Philadelphia jury
last March after she said that a CAT scan
at Temple University Hospital made her
lose her psychic abilities. That's what
made the headlines.
Buried at the bottom of both wire-service stories was the fact that Judge Leon
Katz told the jury to disregard that issue,
and to base the verdict on whether the
hospital was negligent in administering a
contrast dye into her brain. The procedure allegedly caused Haimes to suffer
breathing difficulties, intense headaches,
nausea, and incontinence. What the jury
really decided was that the hospital had
negligently caused Haimes's adverse
physical reaction, not that she had lost her
psychic powers.
A Crum & Forster ad in 1977 referred
to the man who used a lawn mower to trim
a hedge, hurt himself, sued the manufacturer, and won. The tale has been
repeated dozens of times in support of the
notion that consumers injure themselves
foolishly and then seek out greedy lawyers to bring groundless lawsuits. But the
story was purely apocryphal. Crum &
Forster admitted that it had no reliable
source for the alleged incident.
And that vandal who fell through the
skylight? There's some truth to that one.
But the incident isn't as absurd as it first
sounds. The skylight was painted the
same color as the school's roof. The
school district knew that situation was
hazardous because a young girl had
already been killed falling through a similar skylight at another school six months
before.
When a plaintiff receives a large award,
it's usually for a very good reason. Jury
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Verdict Research has on file 2094 cases in
which initial verdicts equalled or
exceeded $l-million during the period
from 1962 to 1985. Of those, 71 percent
were for such damages as paralysis, permanent brain damage, wrongful death,
amputations, and burns.

What insurers want
Several proposals have been put forth
by the insurance industry and its supporters in state legislatures.
Limits on awards for pain and suffering. Most industry-backed tortreform proposals do not attempt to limit
the amount of recovery for economic
losses such as lost wages and medical
costs. However, limits are being proposed
on compensating victims for the pain and
suffering that results from an injury. CU
believes that while those harms are difficult to quantify, they are nonetheless real
and should not be subject to a fixed, preset limit. A man confined to a wheelchair
as a result of someone's negligence but
still able to keep working at his regular
desk job might suffer no lost wages, but
certainly his quality of life would be
affected.
Limits on punitive damages. Punitive damages, as the name implies, are
imposed to punish a defendant for acting
irresponsibly or with disregard for safety.
CU believes punitive damages must be

maintained in full force to help deter manufacturers and others from irresponsible
behavior.
Elimination of joint and several
liability. The legal doctrine of joint and
several liability applies when more than
one defendant is responsible for causing
an injury. If one defendant cannot pay, the
burden of payment is transferred to the
other parties found to be at fault.
Critics of the doctrine say that it
encourages plaintiffs to sue multiple
defendants, especially those with "deep
pockets," such as large corporations,
municipalities, and people who carry a lot
of insurance.! Why;1 they ask,-should a
wealthy defendant that bears only, say, 5
percent of the responsibility for a mishap
have to pay for most or all of the damages,
simply because the other defendants cannot pay?
The question is a valid one, and the
issue a complex one. But CU does not
believe the doctrine should be abolished.
Without it, there would be no mechanism
to make sure victims can recover a fair
amount for damages. If the doctrine of
joint and several liability were eliminated,
victims would be left holding the bag when
those defendants able to pay succeed in
shifting the blame to those who can't.
Limiting contingency fees. Lawyers who take on a liability or malpractice
case typically work on a contingency-fee

Why insurers love the tax code
Between 1975 and 1984, the property-and-casualty insurance industry's
assets more than tripled, to $265-billion. Industry surpluses—assets left
after liabilities are deducted—are at
near-record levels of $64-billion. Both
assets and surpluses have shown a
nearly unbroken record of growth
through the recent so-called crisis
years. Over those same years, the
industry has also enjoyed substantial
profits. Part of the reason has to do
with the industry's favored tax status.
Here's how the system works:
When a policyholder files a claim,
the insurance company estimates
what its ultimate payment will be and
sets that money aside into a "loss
reserve." The money may not actually be paid out for years, especially if
damage disputes are dragged through
the courts. But for tax.purposes that
money is deducted as an expense.
Using this privilege, companies salt
away billions of dollars.
Meanwhile, the insurance company
invests the loss reserve in bonds, real
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estate, or the stock market, and garners a profit (The profit is taxable,
unless it flows from a tax-exempt
investment such as municipal bonds.)
"As a result of certain tax advantages, many property/casualty companies have not paid federal income
taxes for a number of years and, in
fact, have qualified for refunds," said
Natwar M. Gandhi of the U.S. General Accounting Office. "While property and casualty companies had
about $46-billion m underwriting
losses from 1975ithrough 1984, they
had about $121-billion in investment
gains during this period, resulting in a
net gain of about $75-billion for those
years. From 1975 through 1984, federal income taxes were a negative
$ J25-million, a rate of minus 0.2 percent of the ne\ gain."
Tti6 tax-revision proposals currently being considered by Congress
woulrfmake little dent in the iijsurance industry's tax privileges; they •
wouldr however, impose a minimum
tax on insurance companies.

basis: They get a percentage of the damage award, typically about 30 percent of
the damages paid. If they lose the case,
they get nothing. Such a system allows
victims who aren't wealthy to obtain legal
representation at little or no initial cost.
At the same time, because attorneys are
"investing" their own time and money in
the case, they have an incentive to weed
out frivolous or weak cases. Furthermore,
it would create an imbalance if lawyers for
injured consumers were subject to a form
of price control while corporations and
other large defendants were not limited in
their legal budget. All in all, CU thinks the
contingency-fee arrangement is an
acceptable one.

The wrong cure
Clearly, however, the insurance companies' message is getting through. State
and Federal legislators have passed or are
considering a number of industry-backed
tort-reform proposals, most of which
would limit compensation to victims.
Maryland, for example, has put a
$350,000 cap on pain and suffering damages in personal-injury cases. Missouri set
the same limit for pain and suffering
awards in malpractice cases.
In June, the New Jersey Assembly
passed and sent to the state Senate a bill
that would limit pain-and-suffering damages to $5000 for minor injuries,
$300,000 for catastrophic injuries. The
bill also sets a $500,000 lid on the amount
a person could collect from a public entity,
such as a county or municipality.
In California, voters recently passed
Proposition 51, which eliminated the legal
doctrine of joint-and-several liability for
pain-and-suffering damages. And the Florida legislature this June passed a bill to
limit awards for pain and suffering to a
maximum of $450,000. (The Florida legislature, tied the measure to a 40 percent
rollback in liability-insurance premiums.
Within two days, six insurance companies
had announced that they would no longer
write new commercial liability insurance
in the Sunshine State.)
In New York, the Governor's commission recommended some changes in the
tort system, such as modifying the doctrine of joint and several liability. CU's
Executive Director, Rhoda Karpatkin,
served on the commission and filed a dissent. Nonetheless, a bill incorporating
some tort-system changes—undesirable
ones, in our opinion—was about to be
signed into law as this issue went to
press.
The Reagan Administration has proposed a sweeping package that could
cover product-liability claims against corporations, Government contractors, and
the U.S. Government itself. The Reagan
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plan, which Attorney General Edwin
Meese called a response to "the crisis in
tort liability" would impose caps of
$100,000 on awards for noneconomic
damages such as pain and suffering. Punitive damages would also be capped at
$100,000. In addition, the Reagan bill
would limit fees that lawyers could charge
in product-liability cases.
Such tort-reform measures will not
solve the insurance crisis. Indeed, similar
measures have been tried in various
places—with little if any effect on insurance rates or availability. In Ontario,
Canada, lawyers' contingency fees are not
allowed and awards for pain and suffering
are capped. Nonetheless, liability-insurance rates in Ontario are skyrocketing
and the insurance is hard to get—just as
in the U.S.
In hearings before state legislatures,
insurance-industry representatives have
declined to promise that the tort-reform
measures they advocate would result in
lower insurance premiums. Even if they
ended the industry's self-inflicted crisis,
however, such measures would still be
repressive and undesirable, in our view.
Adequate compensation for injured parties is a part of our system of justice.

The right cure
The lawsuit crisis may be phony, but
the insurance crisis is real. Towns, doctors, day-care centers, and others face
urgent problems of insurance availability
and affordability. What is needed to alleviate the problem is not tort reform but
better regulation of the insurance industry. The Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance in New York
has put forward several worthwhile recommendations for strengthening the regulatory system:
H Price regulation. Insurance regulators should do more to keep prices on an
even keel, discouraging both excessive
and artificial cyclical price cuts that
endanger the health of insurance companies and excessive price hikes that create
hardships for consumers.
The Commission suggested that a state
insurance department can achieve this
goal in part by setting upper and lower
limits on permissible prices that insurers
may charge. That practice would help to
avoid wild swings, while still giving insurers some flexibility. As in any priceregulated industry, insurance companies
could request changes in the permitted
price bands from time to time.
D Limiting cancellations. The
recent crisis atmosphere was created
partly because of abrupt cancellations or
nonrenewal of coverage by insurers. The
Commission proposed that insurance
companies be permitted to cancel or
C O N S U M F R RPPOPTQ
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refuse to renew coverage only in certain
clearly defined circumstances, such as
nonpayment of premiums or fraud on the
part of the insured. A "major change in
the scale of risk" assumed by the insurer
would be a valid cause for cancellation or
non-renewal. But presumably the insurer
would have to demonstrate to regulators
that the risk level had indeed become
unreasonable.
U Providing more resources. The
insurance industry is regulated almost
exclusively by the 50 states, even though
the industry has been nationwide in scope
for decades. State insurance regulators
are typically understaffed operations that
are responsible for more work than they
can capably handle.
Federal oversight is needed. But so
long as the states have the responsibility,
the state insurance departments need
more staff, more money, and in many
cases more legal authority.
U Appointing a consumer advocate. The Commission recommended
that an individual be appointed to work full
time representing the interests of consumers before the New York State Insurance Department. In light of the strong
lobbying presence of the insurance industry in every state, the suggestion is a
sensible one for all states to consider.
H Letting municipalities pool
risks. The Commission suggested creating a structure whereby municipalities
and other government bodies could share
the risks of liability claims. Since one
large claim could severely damage a small
town, county, or government body, that
suggestion makes sense. It's also consistent with the theory of insurance, in which
many parties share the risk of an event
that will probably happen only to a few.
In addition to those recommendations,
CU also advocates three more.
First, the insurance industry should be
subject to both Federal and state antitrust
laws (the laws that ban price-fixing), as
most industries are. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which Congress passed
in 1945, insurance companies are all but
exempt from Federal antitrust rules. That
makes it harder to stop companies if they
act in concert to raise prices for a particular line of insurance.
Second, conflict-of-interest policies for
insurance regulators should be made
stiffer, in light of a U.S. General Accounting Office studyfindingthat half of state
insurance regulators either came from
the insurance industry or found employment in it after leaving office.
Third, state regulators should encourage insurance companies to offer economic incentives to corporations and
municipalities that follow good safety and
risk-management practices.
•
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